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VI. THE USE OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN ENTRAPMENT CASES:
UNITED STATES V. MCCLAIN
A. Introduction
In United States v. McClain,1 the Ninth Circuit held that in entrap-
ment cases hearsay is not admissible to prove the defendant's predisposi-
tion to commit the offense charged.' The court reasoned that hearsay
statements that the defendant was a dealer in narcotics were relevant only
for purposes of proving predisposition, not the government agent's good
faith, and as such, did not fit any recognized exception. In so holding,
the court has seemingly rectified confusion within the Ninth Circuit.
B. The Defense
An agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, with the assist-
ance of two informants, set up a sale of cocaine with McClain, who was
allegedly selling cocaine in kilogram lots. The agent had one of the
men flown to San Diego to effect the sale. While the agent negotiated
the sale with McClain at the airport, the informant was sent to a nearby
parking lot to determine whether the cocaine was in fact in McClain's
car. Upon the informant's affirmative report, the parties left the build-
ing in which the meeting was held so that the agent could obtain money
needed for the sale. On a signal from the informant, McClain was
arrested by waiting officers. They then conducted a warrantless search
of McClain's car and obtained the cocaine, which formed the basis for
the charge of possession of over a kilogram of cocaine with the intent to
distribute it.3 Because the informant's fare to San Diego was paid by
1. 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 437.
3. Id. at 432. On appeal defendant also asserted the error of the trial court in deny-
ing a motion to suppress the cocaine as having been obtained from defendant's car with-
out a warrant in violation of the fourth amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court. There being no dispute that the agent had probable cause to search, the
court reached the issue of whether this warrantless search was proper in light of Supreme
Court decisions.
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), a warrantless search of an automo-
bile was upheld where there was no arrest of its occupants because of the possibility
that the automobile could be driven away before the procurement of a warrant. Simi-
larly, in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court upheld a search of an
automobile which had been impounded at the police station after the arrest of its occu-
pants on the open highway. Because the police had probable cause to search the auto-
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the government, the defendant raised the entrapment defense. The trial
court submitted the issue to the jury. In order to rebut the defendant's
contention, the court allowed the government, over objection by the
defendant,4 to present the testimony of two witnesses that an acquaint-
ance of McClain had reported that McClain was a good source of co-
caine. The testimony was permitted on the theory that such hearsay was
admissible to show predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime,
thereby rebutting the defense of entrapment. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit rejected this theory, but found the error harmless since "the
mobile on the highway without a warrant, the Court found no greater intrusion upon
fourth amendment rights by a later warrantless search at the station.
McClain involved a search of the automobile at the place of arrest rather than after
impound, but the court nevertheless found the Chambers rationale applicable. The de-
fendant was not arrested while driving on a public highway; rather, his automobile was
in a nearby parking lot at the time of arrest. The court found this difference immate-
rial, reasoning that the automobile was in a public place at a late hour of the night
within access of possible accomplices who might seek to reach it or the $35,000 contra-
band which it contained. Chambers did not mandate that the automobile be impounded.
Furthermore, the court noted that the officers were unsure as to which of two automo-
biles described by the informant contained the contraband; thus, the procurement of a
warrant before search would not have been possible.
McClain did not fit the circumstances or lack thereof which Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) found inappropriate to justify a warrantless search. In that
case none of the exigencies of Carroll and Chambers were found present to justify
a search without a warrafit. While the court in McClain expressed concern over the
statement in Coolidge suggesting that the possibility that an accomplice could obtain ac-
cess to and move the automobile was insufficient to invoke the Carroll rationale, it nev-
ertheless found the search appropriate both in light of United States Supreme Court
cases subsequent to Coolidge and lower court decisions which have tended to rebut any
limitation by Coolidge of Chambers.
The last issue reached by the court was whether McClain had been coerced by gov-
ernmental activity to commit a crime which he was not predisposed to commit. The
only evidence found by the court was testimony by McClain that the two informants
prior to the contact with the government agent beat him, stopping only when he agreed
to commit the offense. 531 F.2d at 438. The court recognized coercion by a govern-
ment agent could be a form of entrapment, but because it found that the mere payment
of travel expenses to an informant did not render his activity governmental, the court
determined that this was not the case. The court then stated that coercion by a third
party may also establish entrapment which could not be defeated by evidence of predis-
position. But the court found the present case did not present such a situation because
"[tihe threat must be 'of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done.' In addition, there must be a show-
ing that '. . . there was no reasonable opportunity to escape."' Id. citing United States
v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1975).
4. The fact that the defense counsel objected to this testimony is critical in view of
this court's decision as to the hearsay. The McClain court points out that earlier deci-
sions may have turned on the absence of appropriate objections. 431 F.2d at 437. See
text accompanying notes 32 & 33 infra.
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evidence against McClain [was] so strong, and the hearsay testimony
[was] so small a part of the record, as to be harmless."5
C. Two Theories of Entrapment and the Implications
The use of subterfuge and deception by law enforcement agencies in
undercover work to combat crimes otherwise difficult to detect, such as
the manufacture and distribution of narcotics, sex offenses, and gam-
bling, led to the development of the entrapment defense.0 This was
designed to protect against overreaching by law enforcement officials
who in effect initiate and help implement the crime committed by the
defendant.7  The defense of entrapment was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States" and subsequently reaffirmed
in Sherman v. United States.' Although the Court has recognized the
need for the defense, there has been sharp division over its underlying
rationale.
Writing for the majority in Sorrells, Chief Justice Hughes reasoned
that Congress did not intend to convict persons under a prohibition
statute "when the criminal design originates with the officials of the
Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission
. 10 Thus, the majority opinion sought to protect innocent per-
sons from being lured into crime by government agents. On the other
hand, protection was not afforded persons predisposed to commit the
crime. As Chief Justice Warren said in Sherman, "a line must be
5. United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 1976).
6. See generally DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its
History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REv. 243 (1967); Donnelly, Judicial Con-
trol of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YAL LJ. 1091
(1951); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. o.n PA. L.
Rav. 245 (1942); Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967
DuxE L. 39; Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L.
REV. 871, 889-993 (1963); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems
in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FoRD. L. I~v. 399 (1959).
7. The first cohesive definition of entrapment by the Supreme Court was enunciated
by Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932):
Entrapment is -the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his
procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except
for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.
Id. at 454.
8. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The first circuit court case to deal with entrapment was
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). The doctrine was well-received
and spread quickly. See DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility:
Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F. L REv. 243, 249 (1967).
9. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
10. 287 U.S. at 442.
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drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal.""1 The government, then, may respond to the de-
fendant's entrapment claim by introducing evidence to prove that the
defendant would have committed the offense regardless of the govern-
ment's inducement. This approach has been labeled the "subjective"
test in recognition of the emphasis it places on the defendant's conduct,
predisposition, and intent.
In contrast to this is the "objective" test which focuses on the conduct
of the government agents rather than the defendant's predisposition. In
a separate opinion in Sorrells, Justice Roberts rejected the "legislative
intent" argument of the majority and based his justification of entrap-
ment on considerations of public policy and judicial integrity-on "the
inherent right of the court not to be made the instrument of wrong."
12
Under this theory, "[t]he courts refuse to convict an entrapped defend-
ant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute,
but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on
behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be counte-
nanced." '  This "objective" approach does not focus on the defend-
ant's predisposition. Rather, to establish entrapment the defendant
must show that the government agents (1) originated the crime and
induced the defendant to commit it, and (2) used methods of induce-
ment such as would cause an ordinary person who normally would not
commit the crime, to engage in criminal activity. 4
In United States v. Russell'5 and Hampton v. United States,'6 the
Court has reaffirmed the majority approach of Sorrells and Sherman in
holding that the entrapment defense is not available to the defendant
even though the government agent supplies ingredients necessary to
manufacture drugs.' 7  The Court focused singularly on the intent or
11. 356 U.S. at 372.
12. 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring).
13. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., CRmuMIAL LAW § 48, at 371 (1972).
15. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
16. 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976).
17. There existed a basic factual difference between United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 96S. Ct. 1646 (1976):
In Russell the ingredient supplied by the government agent was a legal drug which
the defendants demonstrably could have obtained from other sources besides the
Government. Here the drug which the government informant allegedly supplied
to petitioner was both illegal and constituted the corpus delicti for the sale of which
the petitioner was convicted. The Government obviously played a more significant
role in enabling petitioner to sell contraband in this case than it did in Russell.
Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 1649 (1976). Hampton's counsel had con-
ceded on appeal that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. United States
v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832, 836 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974). Therefore, Hampton's defense of
1976]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
predisposition of the defendant. The objective test, which looks to the
conduct of the government officials, was explicitly rejected whenever the
predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was established.'
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a slight variation of the standard
enunciated in Russell. The courts have conducted separate inquiries
into whether the government induced the defendant to commit the
offense alleged, and whether the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime.19 However, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit conforms with
Russell in finding predisposition dispositive of the entrapment issue.20
The procedural implications of a subjective approach are far-reach-
ing. When the entrapment defense is raised, the defendant "cannot
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct
and predisposition as bearing upon that issue."21 Thus, normally inad-
missible evidence becomes admissible to prove state of mind. The
defendant's predisposition has been shown by prior convictions for
similar conduct, by prior similar conduct, and by hearsay statements.
22
Because the Supreme Court has not specifically delimited the permissi-
ble scope of evidence admissible to rebut the defense of entrapment,
federal courts have adopted varying opinions on the admissibility of
hearsay evidence to prove predisposition. 23 The problem lies in hearsay
entrapment was, by necessity, pegged to the question left open in Russell:
[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law en-
forcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ....
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
The Hampton Court, however, was impressed neither with the factual distinction ("the
difference is one of degree, not of kind") nor with the due process claim. Since the
government agents were merely acting "in concert" with Hampton, and predisposition
was either found by the jury or conceded on appeal, Hampton's predisposition to commit
the crime charged "rendered [the entrapment] defense unavailable to him." Hampton v.
United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 1649 (1976).
18. Id.; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
19. United States v. Ladley, 517 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Pena-Ozuna, 511 F.2d 1106, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Payseur, 501
F.2d 966, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1974).
20. In United States v. Payseur, 501 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1974), the court stated:
"[tihe record indisputably shows that Payseur was predisposed to commit the crime and
the court therefore had a duty to rule on the issue of entrapment as a matter of law."
Id. at 971.
21. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
22. See Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J.
39, 59; Comment, 1 U.S.F. L. REv. 177, 179 (1966).
23. The Fifth Circuit commonly admits hearsay statements to prove predisposition.
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"statements" made by faceless informants to government agents, to
which the latter testify. Justice Stewart pinpointed the dangers in the
use of this type of evidence in his dissent in Russell:
[A] test that makes the entrapment defense depend on whether the de-
fendant had the requisite predisposition permits the introduction into
evidence of all kinds of hearsay, suspicion, and rumor-all of which
would be inadmissible in any other context-in order to prove defend-
ant's predisposition.
24
D. An Attack on Hearsay Statements to Prove Predisposition
In support of its conclusions that the hearsay was inadmissible, the
McClain court severely criticized a series of Fifth Circuit cases which
upheld the admission of hearsay to prove defendant's predisposition
once the entrapment defense had been raised.25  The basis of the Fifth
United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Simon, 488
F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Brookes, 477 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 562, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1971); Thompson v. United
States, 403 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1968); Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d 529, 530
(5th Cir. 1968); Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1960). In
accord is the Eighth Circuit, Seigal v. United States, 16 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1926), as
well as the Ninth Circuit prior to McClain. Pulido v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391
(9th Cir. 1970); Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954).
In at least two circuits such evidence had been explicitly rejected. United States v.
Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st
Cir. 1961).
24. 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958), Justice Frankfurter addressed the prejudice likely to attend the admission
of hearsay evidence to show predisposition, even with a limiting instruction:
The danger of prejudice in such a situation, particularly if the issue of entrapment
must be submitted to the jury and disposed of by a general verdict of guilty or in-
nocent, is evident. The defendant must either forego the claim of entrapment or
run the substantial risk that, in spite of instructions, the jury will allow a criminal
record or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt of the specific offense
of which he stands charged.
Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
McClain does not completely resolve the problem raised by Justice Frankfurter. Only
hearsay statements are eliminated as evidence of predisposition. Other evidence, such
as reliable reputation evidence, similar bad acts, and a criminal record are still admis-
sible to show predisposition of a defendant who has raised the entrapment defense. See
note 22 supra. This is still unacceptable to those who, like Justice Frankfurter, desire
a test that examines only the conduct of the officers and agents. As he stated: "a test
that looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct
of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of entrapment." Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958). However, in light of United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976),
the subjective test seems firmly entrenched. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
25. United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Simon,
488 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Brooks, 477 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1973);
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Circuit's holding was that the defendant's character was relevant to
prove the reasonableness of the government agent's good faith con-
duct.2 6 At the time the leading case in the Fifth Circuit was decided, 27
United States v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 562, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1971); Thompson v. United
States, 403 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1968); Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d 529, 530
(5th Cir. 1968); Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1960).
26. This theory arose with the case of Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687
(5th Cir. 1960), in which evidence of the defendant's reputation as a narcotics dealer,
based on information given to the government-agent witness by several unnamed people,
was allowed to be introduced "only for the limited purposes of determining if (the gov-
ernment agent involved) had good cause to believe that Washington was trafficking in
narcotics." Id. at 690. This was predicated on the statement that:
Once the defense of entrapment has been raised, it is proper to inquire into the repu-
tation of the defendant to determine his predisposition to commit the offense or
to inquire into the reasonableness of the officer's conduct. Sherman v. United
States, supra; Sorrells v. United States, supra; Accardi v. United States, [257 F.2d
168 (5th Cir. 1958)]; Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cir., 1944, 143 F.2d 953.
Id. However, neither Sorrells nor Sherman dealt with the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence. In Sherman there is a reference to previous narcotics convictions. 356 U.S. at
375. In Sorrells the Court merely said that the defendant cannot complain about an
examination into his predisposition. 287 U.S. at 451. But in neither of these cases did
the Court rule upon the admissibility of the evidence. In the words of the McClain
court: "[t]his hardly amounts to the creation of a brand new exception to the hearsay
rule!" 531 F.2d at 436.
Other authorities cited by the court in Washington do not deal with the admissibility
of hearsay, or admissibility of any evidence at all. There is some evidence of reputation
in Mitchell showing the reasonableness of the agent's actions to legally entrap the de-
fenant, but the defendant did not object to any evidence admitted. The court in Mitchell
did say that this evidence in addition to the circumstances of the transaction "amply
sustains the government's contention that the government through its agents had reason-
able cause to believe that appellant was violating the law." 143 F.2d at 957. In Ac-
cardi the defendant merely raised the issue of whether there was entrapment as a matter
of law. The court looked only to the defendant's actions at the time the crime was com-
mitted and not the hearsay reputation evidence in determining whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime.
The evidence in Washington was admitted as nonhearsay since it was not intended
to establish the defendant's predisposition, but only to show the reasonableness of the
government's conduct. This distinction is predicated on the use of both the subjective
and objective tests because they consider the agents' conduct (objective test) as well as
the defendant's predisposition (subjective test). Today, in light of Russell v. United
States, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976),
such evidence could not be admitted as nonhearsay because only the predisposition of
the defendant is relevant to the issue of entrapment. Such evidence would therefore be
relevant only for its truth. There would be no exception to make it admissible. See
text accompanying notes 34-38 infra. Thus, the basic reason for admissibility has been
undercut, but the rule was (and is) still being applied.
The rationale of Washington was carried further by the Fifth Circuit in Rocha v.
United States, 401 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968), which extended the rule of admissibility.
There, a narcotics agent testified that he had information from a number of sources,
including an unnamed informant that the defendant dealt in narcotics. The defendant
objected to this testimony on grounds of hearsay; the court disagreed, citing Washington
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the conduct of the government agent was at least arguably relevant since
the outcome of the "subjective-objective" struggle was undecided.2 The
out-of-court statements were then not offered to prove the truth of the
defendant's prior conduct but rather to show the "reasonableness" of the
conduct of the agent. Russell effectively disposed of this objective
view29 and thus the relevancy of out-of-court statements would only be
for their truth. Yet, even after Russell, the Fifth Circuit has continued
to admit this type of evidence without any accompanying rationale.
But, as accurately perceived by the McClain court:
[S]ubsequent Fifth Circuit cases slide from . . . holding that hearsay
is admissible to show the government agent's good faith to holding it
admissible to show -the defendant's predisposition without any appar-
ent realization that the slide is inappropriate. A government agent's
good faith belief that the defendant is a dealer, like probable cause, can
rest upon hearsay which may or may not be true. But a hearsay state-
ment that the defendant is a dealer can rationally be accepted as a basis
for an inference that defendant is predisposed to deal only if the hearsay
statement is true. This is a classic example of the improper use of
hearsay.30
McClain also revealed the confused state of affairs within the Ninth
Circuit. Two cases permitted the prosecution to introduce the defend-
ant's prior criminal record.8' Others allowed hearsay of the type admit-
ted by the trial court in McClain.2 However, these are complicated by
and stating: "As to entrapment, prior disposition to commit an offense is a vital le-
ment. Reputation in this regard, once the issue is raised, is competent." 410 F.2d at
530. On this reasoning the court allowed the reputation evidence, which is arguably
mere opinion evidence, for the truth of the matter stated, without establishing the neces-
sary exception to the hearsay rule. See text accompanying notes 36-37 infra.
On this doubtful premise, the Fifth Circuit continued to admit hearsay evidence of
reputation without any further rationale, but merely citing Washington. See United
States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Simon, 488 F.2d 133
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Brooks, 477 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 562, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1971); Thompson v. United States, 403
F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1968).
27. Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1960).
28. Washington v. United States, 275 U.S. 687 (5th Cir. 1960), predated the Su-
preme Court's definitive ruling in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
30. 531 F.2d at 436 (emphasis added).
31. Pulido v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1970) (prior arrest); Carlton
v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1952) (convictions).
32. United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1969); Trice v. United States,
211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954); cf. Pulido v. United States,
425 F.2d 139.1 (9th Cir. 1970).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the fact that defense counsel never objected to its introduction on
grounds of hearsay. 3
In McClain the out-of-court declarant was a friend of the defendant.
This was not a case in which "a government agent had been told by an
unknown number of unknown informants that McClain was dealing in
narcotics. '' 34 Still, upon analysis, the court appears correct in rejecting
the hearsay testimony and the line of Fifth Circuit cases.
The out-of-court statement might assume the form of opinion or
reputation evidence. In McClain, the proffered evidence seems to be
merely the declarant's opinion, based on personal knowledge, rather
than evidence of the defendant's reputation in the community. 85 Which-
ever form it assumes, the statements are properly excluded under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
If the statement is considered to be opinion evidence of character, the
Federal Rules contain no hearsay exception which would overcome its
presumptive inadmissibility.3 6  Obviously, opinion testimony is reliable
only if the opinion-giver is in court to render it, where the basis for it
can be tested under cross-examination. If the evidence takes the form
of community reputation, the Federal Rules of Evidence do contain a
hearsay exception for reputation used to show a person's character. 1 It
must be questioned, however, whether an entrapment situation presents
a usage of reputation evidence envisioned by the drafters of that provi-
sion. In the typical situation a witness testifying as to reputation is a
member of the defendant's community.38 In fact, the witness must have
33. United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431, 437 (9th Cir. 1976).
34. Id. at 438.
35. The McClain court recounted the evidence as follows:
[Witness] Cobb testified that Dusty, a friend of MeLain, told him that he had a
friend in San Diego who was a good outlet for cocaine. . . . [Witness] Peterson tes-
tified that Dusty said that he had a friend in San Diego. . .who was a good outlet
for cocaine.
531 F.2d at 438. The testimony does not assess McClain's reputation. Rather, it is
merely hearsay statements of Cobb and Peterson that in their opinion McClain was a
good source of cocaine. While Cobb and Peterson were subject to extensive cross-ex-
amintation, the prosecution did not attempt to call "Dusty," the declarant, as a witness.
Id.
36. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
37. Rule 803(21) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
"(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among
his associates or in the community.
Fed. R. Evid. 803 (21).
38. In United States v. Whiting, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961), the court spelled out
the proper foundation for reputation evidence:
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personal knowledge of the community opinion regarding the defendant's
character, for he is deemed to be an expert on matters known by the
community39 and may be cross-examined by defense counsel as to his
knowledge of the defendant's activities. When an "expert" in commu-
nity affairs does not occupy the witness stand but is an out-of-court
declarant, the result is multiple levels of hearsay. The first level is the
community's opinion of the defendant as known by the declarant; the
second is the transmission of that consensus to the government agent-
witness. While the first level qualifies as a hearsay exception, the second
level does not. However, this is the situation a court creates by admitting
reputation evidence to prove predisposition if the witness is not a member
of the community but is a government agent. The defendant is de-
prived of the opportunity to examine the basis of that reputation in the
community or the declarant's knowledge of it. At best, he can merely
discover whether the alledged reputation was in fact transmitted.
In McClain the prosecution did not attempt to argue 0 that the
hearsay statements fit within the newly-created "catch-all" provision in
Federal ,Rule 803(24),4' but undoubtedly the attempt will be made in
the future. However, it would seem that prosecutors will be hard-
pressed to demonstrate the high degree of trustworthiness required
under this provision on the issue of predisposition in entrapment cases.
E. Conclusion
Since Russell, predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime
charged is the central inquiry in entrapment cases. As in McClain the
It is fundamental that to qualify a witness as competent to give testimony concern-
ing a defendant's character and reputation in the community it is usually required
that there be a showing that the statements uttered by the witness are representative.
It is generally required that the witness must show that he lives or works in a given
community and is familiar with the reputation of the defendant. In short, there
must be some demonstrable basis evincing the competence of the witness to give his
opinion.
Id. at 517.
39. 3 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EvIrNcE §§ 691, 692 (3rd ed. 1940).
40. 431 F.2d at 437.
41. Rule 803(24) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: ....
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently
in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Fed. R. Evid. 803 (24).
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government often attempts to prove predisposition by putting agents on
the witness stand who testify that an out-of-court source said that the
defendant was a good source of narcotics or, that the defendant was
considered by the community to be a good source of narcotics. These
out-of-court statements are relevant only to prove predisposition and, as
such, they are hearsay. Because they do not fit a recognized exception
to the hearsay rule, they are properly excluded in entrapment cases.
Anita E. Ruud
